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GOOD FAITH UNDER THE FIDUCARIES ACT
New Mexico. The good faith required of a person taking a
negotiable instrument in order to stand as a holder in due course
under the Negotiable Instruments Law has come to be almost uni-
formly treated from the standpoint of honesty.' This is in contrast
with the common law test of a bona fide purchaser. Freedom
from negligence characterizes the common law approach in deter-
ining whether or not a transaction may be sheltered under the
rights and privileges accorded a bona fide purchaser.2
Under the more recent Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act'
authority is scant and lacking in uniformity. In two cases the
honesty test has been applied.4 In another case the good faith of
a purchaser under this act was determined by the rule of negli-
gence.5
Consistent with the purpose of achieving uniformity in dealing
with commercial paper is the application of the Fiduciaries Act of
New Mexico6 in a case of first impression, Roswell State Bank v.
Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., Inc.7 The Act specifically states that
a thing is done in good faith when it is in fact done honestly,
whether it be done negigently or not. Further, by its terms the Act
indicates exculpation of a bank when it is sought to be charged
by a fiduciary's principal.
The court held a statutory right was created in favor of a bank
acting in good faith against a faithless fiduciary's principal to en-
force payment of an instrument dishonored by the principal. The
faithless fiduciary appeared on the bill as agent-drawer, agent-
acceptor, and as payee. The bill drawn on a Texas bank was de-
1 See authorities collected in 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, § 324.
2 See 27 R.C.L., Vendor and Purchaser, § 475.
3 §§41, 47; see TEX. Rev. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 5652, 5658.
4 Grauman v. Jackson, 216 Ark. 362, 225 S. W. 2d 678 (1950) ; Starkey v. Nixon, 151
Tenn. 637, 270 S. W. 980 (1925).
5 City Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Nelson, 218 Ala. 90, 117 So. 681 (1928).
6 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 36-101 et seq.
7 56 N. M. 107, 240 P. 2d 1143 (1952).
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posited to the fiduciary's personal account in plaintiff bank. With-
drawal of the funds by the fiduciary was permitted by the plaintiff
bank prior to clearance by the drawee bank but upon instruction
from the drawee to plaintiff in a telephone communication made
upon insistence by the fiduciary. Thereafter the bill was dis-
honored.
The parties were reversed from the positions specifically pro-
vided for by Section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. But the
court, consistent with the good faith provision, interpreted the Act
to give the bank not only a good defense against the principal but
to establish a cause of action in favor of the bank. Under this
Section the bank was not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary
was committing a breach of his obligation where he had authority
to draw on the account of his principal and the amount drawn was
credited to his personal account and later withdrawn.
SET-OFF AGAINST A NOTE
ASSIGNED AFTER MATURITY
New Mexico. In Turkenkoph v. Te Beests a note was assigned
in good faith for value but after maturity. After maturity, but
prior to the assignment, a debt arose in favor of the maker against
the assignor of the note. Action was initiated by the maker against
the assignor prior to notice of assignment of the note to collect the
debt, which arose out of collateral matters. The assignee, a party
defendant, filed a cross-action against the maker to collect the
note, and as against this claim the maker of the note as cross-de-
fendant urged his right to set-off against the note.
The court recognized that set-off and counterclaims exist by
reason of statutory law only and that the apparent discord in the
decisions relating to set-off and counterclaims exists only because
855 N. M. 279, 232 P. 2d 684 (1951).
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of the wide variety in statutory provisions. Section 58 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law9 would not permit set-off against the
note if the "defenses" referred to be interpreted to mean only such
defenses as inhere in the negotiable paper itself. The cross-com-
plainant-assignee urged that this Section of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law was exclusive and should bear the interpretation indi-
cated. The provisions of the New Mexico statute relating to counter-
claims and set-off specifically state that "in case of an assignment
of a chose in action, the action by the assignee shall be without
prejudice to any set-off, counterclaim or other cause of action or
defense, whether matured or not, if matured when pleaded, if
existing in favor of defendant against the assignor, before notice
of the assignment; but this shall not apply to negotiable instru-
ments transferred in good faith, and upon valuable consideration
before maturity." 10
In sustaining the right of the maker to counterclaim against the
assignee under the statute the court held that Section 58 was not
exclusive and did not prevent pleading other defenses not dealt
with or covered in the Negotiable Instruments Law and specifically
authorized by another statute governing practice and procedure in
civil actions. The assignee taking the negotiable instrument after
maturity did not have the protection offered a holder in due course
by the counterclaim and set-off statute.
FICTITIOUS PAYEE
Texas. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an instru-
ment is payable to bearer "when it is payable to the order of a
fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable."' 1 Where an agent draws a negotiable
instrument on his principal's account, there is a division of author-
ity as to whether under the statutory provisions the character of the
paper payable to the order of a fictitious person is determined by
9 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 53-158.
1o N. M. STAT. 1941'ANN. § 19-412.
11 § 9(3) ; Txx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5932.
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the knowledge of the nominal maker or drawer (the principal) or
by the knowledge of the agent.' 2
The precise question has not been decided in Texas. A recent
opinion, the decision of which turned upon whether the doctrine of
election of remedies applied, left the question open and relied
upon a relatively narrow ground, namely, that the agent involved
was not "the person" making the check "so payable" within the
meaning of the Act, in holding that checks there in question were
not bearer instruments.'"
In the case plaintiff's employee A induced plaintiff to issue
checks payable to fictitious claimants, which checks were endorsed
by A in the names of the payees and cashed. The checks were
actually drawn by other employees and were signed by authorized
officers of plaintiff in response to A's requisition. The court found
Section 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law inapplicable. Al-
though A had the knowledge dealt with in the statute, he was not
the person making it "so payable." The contention that the actual
signer was but an automaton or instrumentality through which A
acted was rejected.
The supreme court also declared that the question is settled in
Texas that a depositor is under no duty to his bank to examine
signatures of payees on his cancelled checks and that his failure to
discover such signatures to be forged does not constitute negli-
gence, citing Liberty State Bank v. Guardian Savings and Loan
Association.4 However, the opinion does not preclude the possibil-
ity of adoption of the doctrine that a depositor owes a duty to his
bank in other regards, such as reasonable supervision of employees
having authority to issue or requisition checks and being careful
to draw checks in a manner that does not invite material alteration
or unauthorized signatures. 5
D. Carl Richards.
12 See authorities cited in 10 C.S., Bills and Notes, § 129.
18 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. First National Bank in Dallas, Tex.
245 S. W. 2d 237 (1951).
14 127 Tex. 311, 94 S. W. 2d 133 (1936).
15 See Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
